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Abstract Since the start of the financial crisis, 
firms increasingly search for new finance 
sources. Sovereign Wealth Funds – rapidly 
growing government-owned investment vehicles 
– are investing heavily in equity nowadays. We 
aim to find out how stock markets respond to 
their investments and disinvestments. When 
analysing a global sample for the period January 
2004 - July 2011, we find significantly positive 
(negative) stock market returns on the 
announcement of an investment (divestment). 
Additionally, we find that the market reacts 
stronger to announcements of divestments since 
2008. This provides some evidence for the idea 
that investors look more favourable upon 
Sovereign Wealth Funds nowadays. It appears 
that fears for too much corporate governance 
impact have weakened. This opens up funding 
opportunities for CFO’s of today’s money-
hungry firms. 
Key words: Sovereign Wealth Funds, Firm 
Value, Funding   
 
1. Introduction 
Sovereign Wealth Funds are government-controlled 
funds that invest and manage their countries’ excess 
reserves. Even though the relatively unknown 
Funds have been around for a long time, their 
number and level of activity have increased 
dramatically since 2000 and this growth is expected 
to continue. Nowadays, the Funds have about $5 
trillion of assets under control. This has attracted a 
lot of attention, especially since well-known firms 
such as Volkswagen AG, Porsche, Citicorp, and 
Barclays have become involved.  
 The Funds resemble other institutional 
shareholders in that they also usually take large 
equity stakes in firms. However, being controlled 
and influenced by their governments, the Funds 
might pursue strategic or political goals. 
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transparency. However, like other large 
shareholders, the Funds are likely to create value 
for the existing shareholders because of being able 
to improve the corporate governance of the firms 
they invest in. Therefore, CFO’s of money-hungry 
firms may want to attract investments by liquid 
Funds.  
2. Sovereign Wealth Funds and corporate 
governance 
 
The first Sovereign Wealth Fund that is still active 
was founded by the Kuwaiti government in 1953 to 
manage the financial surpluses earned in the oil 
business. Back in 2000, the Funds managed about 
$1.5 trillion in assets. Nowadays, however, they 
control around $5 trillion. This means that the 
Funds market is already bigger than the hedge fund 
and private equity market combined. The assets 
under control are expected to grow significantly. 
Consequently, from 2000 onwards countries like 
China, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have created 
Sovereign Wealth Funds to manage part of their 
reserves.  
  The creation of Funds changed the 
investment policies and risk profiles of the 
governments. The attention shifted from US 
Treasury Bills to more risky assets, such as shares, 
derivatives and real estate. This shift has resulted in 
debates on the impact of Sovereign Wealth Fund 
investments, since the investments could have a 
severe impact on the company that is being targeted 
by the Fund. One potential impact often referred to 
is the impact on corporate governance.   
 Sovereign Wealth Funds often take large 
stakes in companies and they keep these stakes for 
long periods of time. Like other large shareholders 
(e.g. pension funds, hedge funds, and mutual 
funds), the Funds can be expected to have an 
impact on the corporate governance of a target firm 
(e.g. Dewenter et al., 2010).  
  Since the Funds usually take significant 
stakes in firms, they will have more incentives to 
monitor the performance of these firms than small 
shareholders, who cannot account for the costs that 
accompany monitoring the managers of the firm. 
The presence of the Funds may lead to more 
monitoring activity, thus increasing the value of the 
target company.  
  Funds divestments are likely to have the 
opposite effects of investments. Since the market 
expects that divestments will lead to less 
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monitoring opportunities, firms dealing with Fund 
divestment will experience negative abnormal stock 
price reactions.  
3. Sovereign Wealth Funds transactions after 
2008 
 
Since early 2008, three developments have resulted 
in a more favourable look from politicians and 
media upon Fund investments (Persaud, 2010). 
Firstly, the International Working Group of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) published 24 
voluntary Fund principles; the so-called Santiago 
Principles (IWG, 2008). The principles ensure that 
the Funds are transparent, comply with the rules 
and regulations of the country they invest in, and 
make investments based on a risk-reward trade-off.  
Secondly, the Funds took significant stakes 
in firms during the recent global financial crisis 
(Persaud, 2011). When liquidity on the financial 
markets evaporated, the Funds took stakes in Citi, 
Morgan Stanley, and UBS, amongst others. This 
restored trust and confidence in these firms. 
Consequently, politicians and media welcomed 
Fund investments.  
Thirdly, the Funds have become more risk 
averse since the global financial crisis and this has 
resulted in several changes in their transactions 
patterns. Since, they will likely only make an 
investment when they foresee opportunities to 
increase firm value by means of monitoring 
activities. Because investors know the Funds have 
become more risk averse, they might expect that the 
Fund has scrutinized a target firm when they buy a 
stake of it. 
4. Funds investment and divestment data 
 
In order to find out about recent developments, we 
create a dataset of Fund investments and 
divestments for the period January 2004 – July 
2011. A list of Funds is retrieved from the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
(http://www.Sovereign Wealth Fundinstitute.org/), 
thereby including the Funds with a capitalization of 
over $1 billion, as suggested by Fernandes (2011). 
The 23 Funds sampled represent more than 99 per 
cent of the value of the Fund universe. Next, 
investments in firms with publicly traded equity are 
identified by searching databases.  
 Several filters are applied to clean up the 
sample. Investments in initial public offerings are 
omitted, as the Fund investment impact thereon is 
undeterminable (Kotter and Lel, 2011). 
Simultaneous Fund investments (e.g. consortium 
investments) in the same firm are treated as one 
event (Dewenter et al., 2010). The stock price data 
of 44 targeted firms are not available. The clean 
sample then consists of 232 investments in 190 
unique companies, in 40 different countries. In the 
same manner, there are 101 divestment events in 88 
unique companies, in 18 different countries.  
Moreover, specific data on the background 
of the Funds, including the country of origin and 
the level of transparency are retrieved. Firm 
characteristics data retrieved include the net debt 
ratio, the market capitalization ratio, the data on 
floating shares and the acquired or divested stake. 
The Singaporean Funds Temasek and the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 
make 79 (34%) of the Fund investments. Other 
active Funds are the Norwegian Government 
Pension Fund (25 investments), the three Funds 
from Abu Dhabi (together 24 investments), and the 
Malaysian Fund Khazanah (19 investments). The 
Singaporean Funds are also heavily divesting, with 
47 (46%) of the sample divestments. Other active 
Funds are from Norway (22 divestments) and 
Malaysia (9 divestments).  
 We find that almost 50% of the investment 
and 60% of the divestment transactions take place 
in Asia and Australia and most of these transactions 
were undertaken by the Asian Funds. This 
contradicts suggestions by the media that the Funds 
invest exclusively in firms from OECD countries. 
Out of the 232 investments, 98 were 
conducted during the years 2004-2007. The 
remaining 134 investments took place during the 
period January 2008 – July 2011. The Funds were 
especially active in 2008 and 2009. The divestment 
sample shows a similar distribution. Out of the 101 
divestments, 40 were undertaken before 2008, 
while the remaining 61 were undertaken in the 
period January 2008 – July 2011, also with an 
accent on 2008 and 2009.  
Our sample data on Fund and target firm 
investment characteristics show that the market 
capitalization of target firms ranges from $5.75 
million to $193 billion and is rising (cf. Kotter and 
Lel, 2011). The divestments size varies widely as 
well, namely from $7.2 million to $230 billion. The 
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5. Funds investment and divestment announcement returns 
 
 
The impact of respectively 232 Fund investments 
and 101 divestment announcements on the 
abnormal returns on the share price of a target firm 
during the period January 2004 – July 2011 is 
shown in table 1 above. For the investment sample, 
share prices of firms receiving a Fund investment 
on average rise with 1.29% (t=4.56) during the 
[0,+1] event window. The results remain significant 
when changing the window. The divestment sample 
has an abnormal return of -1.04% (t=-2.90) during 
the [0,+1] period. The [0,+1] results for both of the 
samples are also significant using Corrado’s non-
parametric test. Moreover, there are neither 
significant price run ups prior to the announcement 
of either an investment or divestment nor are there 
any significant post-announcement effects.  
Table 1: Share Price Reactions to the announcement of Sovereign Wealth Fund Transactions 
This table presents the stock price reactions to announcements of Fund investments and divestments 
during the [0;+1], [-1;+1], [-2;+2], [-15;-1], and [2,10] event windows. The investment and divestment 
samples consist of respectively 232 and 101 observations during the period January 2004 - July 2011. 
Daily abnormal returns are used in the Market and Risk Adjusted Returns model in which the MSCI 
World Index is used as market proxy. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5% 
and * indicates significance at 10%. 
 Observations Average z-Statistic Corrado 
A) Investments 
[0,+1] 232  0.0129 4.5631*** 3.6264*** 
[-1,+1] 232 0.0148 4.1853*** 2.9064*** 
[-2,+2] 232  0.0081 1.4048* 1.1865 
[-15,-1] 232  -0.0070 -1.0861 -0.4384 
[2,10] 232 -0.0061 -0.8205 -0.9715 
B) Divestments     
[0,+1] 101  -0.0104 -2.8958*** -3.0215*** 
[-1,+1] 101  -0.0124 -3.0146*** -2.5564*** 
[-2,+2] 101  -0.0140 -2.6137*** -2.3635*** 
[-15,-1] 101  0.0162 1.1963 1.2967 
[2,10] 101 -0.0044 -1.2402 -0.6304 
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6. Announcement returns for investment transactions 
 
Panel A of Table 2 above shows that investments 
before 2008 result in abnormal returns of 1.24% for 
the [0,+1] window, while investments after 2008 
have an abnormal return of 1.32%. However, the 
results are insignificant different for both the 
parametric or the Mann-Whitney U test. These 
findings therefore cannot offer support for the idea 
that that the Fund investments after 2008 result in 
higher returns, because the market would look more 
favourable upon these investments.  
Next, panel B presents the results of 
domestic and foreign investments. The foreign 
investments resulted in abnormal returns of 1.69%, 
which are significant at the 1% level for both the 
parametric and the non-parametric test. The 
domestic returns are lower at 0.48%, but 
insignificant. The differences are significant at the 
5% level for the parametric test and at the 10% 
level for the Mann-Whitney U test. Therefore, 
foreign investments result in higher returns than 
domestic investments.  
Based on the results in Panel A and B, it is 
not surprising that Panel C provides no empirical 
evidence indication that abnormal returns for 
domestic investments before and after 2008 are 
different.  These investments have not become 
more of a strategic nature since the crisis started.  
 Next, panel D shows that transparent and 
opaque Fund investments result in abnormal returns 
of respectively 0.42% and 3.12%. The results for 
the transparent Funds are insignificant, as are the 
differences between the two samples. The results 
provide therefore no support for the idea that 
investors value investments by transparent Funds 
more than investments by opaque Funds.  
Other regression results are that first-time 
investments lead to an increase of 0.36% (t=1.55) 
of the firm value, whereas follow-up investments 
lead to an increase of 3.12% (t=5.69). The 
differences are significant at the 1% level. Also, 
first-time investments by opaque firms result in 
significant abnormal returns of 0.67%, whereas 
their follow-up investments result in significant 
abnormal returns of 3.71%. The differences are 
significant at the 5% level. Yet the differences 
between initial and follow-up investments by 
transparent Funds are not significant.  
 
 
Table 2:  Share price reactions for subsamples on the announcement of a Fund Investment  
The table presents the stock price reactions to announcements of  Fund investments for several 
subsamples during the [0,+1] window. The full sample consists of 232 observations during the period 
January 2004 - July 2011. Daily abnormal returns are used in the Market and Risk Adjusted Returns 
model in which the MSCI World Index is used as market proxy. The last two columns present the results 
when testing for differences between means. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 
5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
A) Obser- 
vations 
Average    z-
Statistic 
Corrado    Mean 




Investments before 2008 98  0.0124 2.9598*** 2.4426***  -0.0049 0.0110 
Investments after 2008 134  0.0132 3.4729*** 2.7705***    
B)         
Domestic Investments 78  0.0048 0.5575 1.0335  1.7436** 1.6153* 
Foreign Investments 154  0.0169 5.2039*** 3.5928***    
C)         
Domestic Investments before 
2008 
39  0.0079 0.1206 1.2097  0.2737 0.4897 
Domestic Investments after 
2008 
39  0.0018 0.6678 0.2286    
D)         
Investments by Transparent 
Funds 
50  0.0042 0.2635 1.2745  1.3288 1.1155 
Investments by Opaque Funds 163  0.0162 4.7511*** 3.4753***    
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7. Announcement returns for divestment transactions 
 
Table 3 above presents the results for several 
divestment subsamples. Panel A shows that 
divestments after 2008 result in significant 
abnormal returns of -1.52%, but the divestments 
returns of -0.33% before 2008 are not significant. 
This difference is significant when using the 
parametric test, but not when using the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney-U test. This offers some 
support for the idea that investors look more 
favourable upon Sovereign Wealth Funds since 
2008.  
 From 2008 onwards, domestic divestments 
could be an indication that the trust in the firms has 
been restored and that the presence of Funds is no 
longer required. However, panel B does not show 
that domestic divestments result in a stronger 
market reaction than foreign divestments. 
Furthermore, panel C shows that divestments 
before 2008 result in insignificant returns of 0.72%, 
whereas the divestments after 2008 lead to 
significant abnormal returns of -1.14%.  
It is not true that divestments by 
transparent Funds result in lower abnormal returns 
than divestments by opaque Funds. According to 
the findings in Panel D, divestments by the latter 
Funds result in significant abnormal returns of -
1.20%, but the divestments by transparent Funds (-
1.20%) are not significant and the difference 
between the two averages are also not significant.  
Panel E shows that foreign divestments 
lead to significant abnormal returns of -1.68% and 
domestic divestments result in insignificant returns 
of -0.41%. The differences are not significant. The 
idea that the connection of the Fund with its 
government gives the target firm an advantage is 
false.   
8. Cross-sectional analysis investment and 
divestment transactions 
 
Table 4 below reports the multivariate regression 
results on the full Fund investment and divestment 
sample. Unfortunately, the explanatory power of 
both of the specifications of the two samples is 
rather low. In the investments case, Size is the only 
significant variable. However, the univariate 
regression results (available upon request) reveal 
that Size does not significantly influence the 
abnormal returns when it is tested for in isolation. 
Instead, Floating Shares is the only variable that 
does have a significant negative influence. The 
Table 3: Share price reactions for subsamples on the announcement of a Fund Divestment 
This table presents the stock price reactions to announcements of Fund divestments for several 
subsamples during the [0,+1] window. The full sample consists of 101 observations during the period 
January 2004 - July 2011. Daily abnormal returns are used in the Market and Risk Adjusted Returns 
model in which the MSCI World Index is the market proxy. The last two columns present the results 
when testing for differences between means. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 
5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
A) Observations Average     z-Statistic Corrado  Mean 
Test   
         MWU 
Divestments before 2008 41  -0.0033 -0.1742 -0.7752  1.9604** 1.0062 
Divestments after 2008 60  -0.0152 -3.6131*** -2.9995***    
B)         
Domestic divestments 51  -0.0041 -0.9692 -1.0196  1.3535* 1.5588* 
Foreign divestments 50  -0.0168 -3.1368*** -2.8904***    
C)         
Domestic divestments before 
2008 
20  0.0072    1.2043 0.5925  1.7822** 1.6215* 
Domestic divestments after 
2008 
31  -0.0114 -2.2105** -1.7467**    
D)         
Divestments by Transparent 
Funds 
55  -0.0081 -1.1456 -1.0154  0.9987 0.8204 
Divestments by Opaque Funds 44  -0.0120   -2.5244*** -2.7443***    
E)         
Entire Divestments 47 -0.0144 -1.7132** -1.9652** 0.3104 0.7047
Partial Divestments 54  -0.0069 -2.3620*** -2.1946**    
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findings imply that abnormal returns decline when 
there are more shares freely floating around, 
contradicting the expectations.  
 
 Table 4: Regressions for the Investment and Divestment Samples  
This table presents regression results for the Investment and Divestment samples. It shows the OLS 
regressions with the Cumulative Abnormal Periods during the event window [0,+1] as the dependent 
variable. The first specification includes all the variables and the second regression includes the 
variables that are significant. The first independent variable is Stake, which refers to the stake the 
Fund takes in a company. Stake2 is the squared stake a Fund has taken in a firm. The Size of the target 
firm is measured by the log of the total market capitalization in billion US Dollars. Net Debt Ratio 
refers to the amount of net debt (measured by total debt minus cash) as fraction of total assets. Sector 
is a dummy variable that refers to the sector the target firm operates in. Firms that were assigned a 0 
do not operate in a strategic industry, whereas firms assigned a 1 do. Floating shares is the fraction of 
liquid shares not being held by large shareholders on the day before the transaction announcement. 
Home Market is a dummy variable, where 0 and 1 represent respectively a domestic and a foreign 
Fund making an investment in a company. Transparency, which is based on the Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index, is also a dummy variable, where 0 represents the Funds that have a 
transparency level that is lower than 8, and 1 represents the other Funds. The p-values, which are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity by using White’s test, are reported below the coefficient estimates. 
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5% and * indicates significance at 10%. 
             Full Investment Sample                Full Divestment Sample   
 1 2   1 2  
Constant 0.1781 0.0340   -0.02958     0.0000 
 (2.2147)** (2.9499)***   (-0.4521)  (0.0002) 
Stake -0.0799    -0.0847  
 (-0.6900)    (-0.8207)  
Stake2 0.0304    0.1793 0.0600 
 (0.1629)    (1.1318) (2.2699)** 
Size -0.0138    0.0029  
 (-1.8100)*    (0.4468)  
Net Debt Ratio -0.0173    -0.0157  
 (-1.0598)    (-0.7604)  
Sector 0.0008    0.0065  
 (0.091)    (0.5722)  
Floating Shares -0.0222 -0.0265   -0.0324 -0.0334 
 (-1.1859) (-1.7004)*   (-2.3873)*** (-2.7608)*** 
Home Market -0.019    0.0265 0.0164 
 (-1.0690)    (2.7395)*** (1.8303)* 
Transparency -0.0115    0.0036  
 (-0.7051)    (0.3889)  
       
Observations 165 206   66 80 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0155 0.0087   0.1023 0.0752 
F-Statistic 1.3237 2.8044***   1.9254* 3.1425** 
 
In the divestment case, Stake2, Floating 
Shares, and Home Market have significant 
coefficients when tested in isolation (results 
available with the authors upon request). In case of 
Stake2, the coefficient in the second specification 
remains positively significant at the 5% level. 
These findings indicate that larger divestments are 
associated with a less negative market reaction.  
The variable Floating Shares remains 
negative and significant at the 1% level. These 
findings indicate that the more shares not held by 
large shareholders, the stronger the market reaction. 
So, there are more other large shareholders with 
fewer shares freely floating around. These 
shareholders might also undertake monitoring 
activities, and the departure of the Fund might 
therefore have less impact.  
Lastly, the coefficient of Home Market is 
positive at the 10% level. Therefore, domestic 
divestments result in a less strong market reaction.  
 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.2 No.3, March 2013





During the last few years, Sovereign Wealth Funds 
have started to play an important role in the global 
financial markets and they have grown bigger than 
the hedge fund and private equity market combined. 
This rapid growth has attracted a lot of political and 
media attention, since many countries consider the 
government-controlled Funds to be a threat to 
domestic industries. However, the academic world 
has only provided limited research on the Funds.  
In this article, we investigated 232 
investments and 101 divestments in public firms 
that were undertaken by Funds in the period 
January 2004 – July 2011. We find that share prices 
of firms receiving an investment from a Fund rise 
significantly with 1.29% during the [0,+1] window. 
Similarly, divestments result in abnormal returns of 
-1.04% during that same period. These results are 
robust. 
The positive (negative) market reaction on 
the announcement of a Fund investment 
(divestment) confirms other studies and indicates 
that the market expects the investing Funds to add 
value to the target company. Since the Funds 
usually take significant stakes, investors expect the 
Funds to improve the corporate governance of the 
target firm by means of monitoring.  
Additionally, we do not find that opaque 
Funds are thought to pose more threat to investors 
than transparent Funds. Yet, subsequent 
investments by opaque Funds result in higher 
returns than first-time investments. Existing 
investors are unsure about the initial purpose of 
opaque Funds, but once realizing that no harmful 
actions follow, they welcome follow-up 
investments. Moreover, we do not show that 
investors value transactions by foreign Funds less 
than domestic ones.  
 Based on these findings, it cannot be 
concluded that the Funds pursue strategic objectives 
that have a negative impact on a target company. 
On the contrary, based on the market reaction, it is 
likely that investors expect the Funds to act as 
financial entities that pursue financial goals. 
Additionally, we also investigated whether 
the attitude towards has changed since 2008, but we 
did not find significant differences between the 
period returns. However, in case of divestments, 
evidence was found divestments after 2008 result in 
a stronger market reaction than before. This offers 
some support for the idea that investors look more 
favourable upon the Funds since 2008. 
Moreover, in case of investments, we find 
a negative relation between free floating shares and 
abnormal returns. The abnormal returns decline 
when large shareholders hold fewer shares. 
However, in case of divestments the market reacts 
stronger when more shares are freely floating.  
Our findings imply that investors, 
governments, and target firms should not worry 
about the Funds. Rather, they should favour Fund 
investments, since these create value by means of 
monitoring activities. Also, by taking stakes in a 
target firm the Funds can show trust when liquidity 
evaporates on the global financial markets.  
Overall, because of their expected growth, 
Funds become important players in the financial 
world that gain a lot of influence by taking 
significant stakes in firms. The media-voiced fear 
for the Funds is understandable, but it lacks 
evidence. Investors do not expect the Funds to 
intend to acquire strategic stakes; their primary 
objective seems to be related to value 
maximization. Firms may therefore want to attract 
them, being liquid investors. So indeed, Sovereign 
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